4 employers charged in workers’ death in Alberta oil and gas development explosion

Employer has done 'pretty significant work internally' on safety program

4 employers charged in workers’ death in Alberta oil and gas development explosion

Three employers were charged for the death of two workers in an explosion at an Alberta worksite in 2022.

The incident happened on Nov. 12, 2022, at an oil and gas development in northern Alberta.

Two workers were welding on top of a tank when an explosion occurred within a tank farm, noted the Alberta government.

Both workers were fatally injured.

Tamarack Valley Energy Ltd.; Voltegic Energy Services Ltd.; Peace Pipefitting Inc.; and 1282446 Alberta Ltd., were all charged for failure to ensure the health and safety of workers; failure to ensure hot work was not begun until a hot work permit was issued; and failure to establish a system or process to ensure compliance with the OHS Act, among others.

Peace Pipefitting and 1282446 Alberta Ltd., being a supervisor, were also charged with one count: Section 4(a)(i) of the OHS Act, failure to take all precautions necessary to protect the health and safety of every worker under the supervisor’s supervision, by failing to take all precautions necessary to protect the two workers by failing to ensure hot work was not conducted on a tank, according to the Alberta government.

Brian Schmidt, president and CEO of Tamarack Energy, said his company, and the other contractors, made changes to policies and procedures after the tragedy, according to a CBC report.

"We did some pretty significant work internally on our safety program and what we're doing here going forward," he said in the report.

Here are the others charges against the employers:

Contravention: Tamarack Valley Energy Ltd.; Voltegic Energy Services Ltd.; Peace Pipefitting Inc.; and 1282446 Alberta Ltd., being an employer, were charged with four counts:

  • Section 3(1)(a) of the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Act, failure to ensure (a) the health and safety of (i) workers engaged in the work of that employer, (ii) those workers not engaged in the work of that employer but present at the work site at which that work was being carried out, and (iii) other persons at or in the vicinity of the work site whose health and safety could be materially affected by identifiable and controllable hazards originating from the work site, by failing to ensure the health and safety of two workers in failing to ensure hot work was not conducted on a tank.
  • Section 169(2)(a) of the OHS Code, failure to ensure hot work was not begun until a hot work permit was issued that indicated the nature of the hazard, the type and frequency of atmospheric testing required, the safe work procedures and precautionary measures to be taken, and the protective equipment required.
  • Section 169(2)(b) of the OHS Code, failure to ensure hot work was not begun until the hot work location was cleared of combustible materials or suitably isolated from combustible materials.
  • Section 169(2)(d)(i) of the OHS Code, failure to ensure hot work was not begun until testing showed that the atmosphere did not contain a flammable substance, in a mixture with air, in an amount exceeding 20 per cent of that substance’s lower explosive limit for gas or vapours.

Tamarack Valley Energy Ltd. and Voltegic Energy Services Ltd., being an employer, were charged with four counts:

  • Section 7(1) of the OHS Code, failure to assess a work site and identify existing and potential hazards, explosion hazards, before work began at the work site or prior to the construction of a new work site.
  • Section 7(4)(b) of the OHS Code, failure to ensure that a hazard assessment was repeated when a new work process was introduced, welding.
  • Section 171.1(1) of the OHS Code, failure to comply with the requirements of CSA Standard W117.2-06, Safety in Welding, Cutting and Allied Processes, by failing to comply with clause 5.4.5 and 11.8.1, contrary to Section 171.1(1) of the OHS Code.
  • Section 171.1(3) of the OHS Code, failure to ensure that, before a welding or allied process was commenced, the area surrounding the operation was inspected and (a) all combustible, flammable or explosive material, dust, gas or vapour was removed or (b) alternate methods of rendering the area safe were implemented.

Tamarack Valley Energy Ltd. was charged with 12 counts:

  • Section 8(1) of the OHS Act, being a contracting employer who directed the activities of an employer involved in work at a work site, failed to ensure the employer complied with the OHS Act, the Regulations and the OHS Code in respect of that work site.
  • Section 8(2) of the OHS Act, being a contracting employer, failed to ensure that any employer on a work site was informed of existing or potential work site hazards that could affect workers or other persons at the work site.
  • Section 10(7)(a) of the OHS Act, being a prime contractor, failed to establish a system or process to ensure compliance with the OHS Act, the Regulations and the OHS Code, in respect of the work site, including a system or process to ensure cooperation between the employer and workers regarding health and safety, by failing to implement the Tamarack Valley Energy Ltd. health and safety system at the work site after amalgamation with Deltastream Energy Corporation.
  • Section 10(7)(a) of the OHS Act, being a prime contractor, failed to establish a system or process to ensure compliance with the OHS Act, the Regulations and the OHS Code, in respect of the work site, including a system or process to ensure cooperation between the employer and workers regarding health and safety, by failing to implement a system or process to ensure oil storage tanks were suitably tested prior to hot work.
  • Section 10(7)(a) of the OHS Act, being a prime contractor, failed to establish a system or process to ensure compliance with the OHS Act, the Regulations and the OHS Code, in respect of the work site, including a system or process to ensure cooperation between the employer and workers regarding health and safety, by failing to implement and enforce Area Turnover Agreements.
  • Section 10(7)(b) of the OHS Act, being a prime contractor, failed to designate a person in writing for the purposes of ensuring cooperation between the employer and workers in respect to health and safety and implementing a system to address the matters set out in section 13(6), contrary to section 10(7)(b) of the OHS Act.
  • Section 10(7)(c) of the OHS Act, being a prime contractor, failed to conduct its own activities in such a way as to ensure that no person was exposed to hazards arising out of, or in connection with, activities at the work site, by issuing a hot work permit for welding on a tank when that tank had not been suitably cleaned for hot work and/or without adequate atmospheric testing.
  • Section 10(7)(c) of the OHS Act, being a prime contractor, failed to conduct its own activities in such a way as to ensure that no person was exposed to hazards arising out of, or in connection with, activities at the work site, by failing to ensure all affected workers were aware that a tank was drained but not suitably cleaned to make it safe for hot work.
  • Section 10(10) of the OHS Act, being a prime contractor, failed to ensure that the owner and any employer, supplier or service provider on a work site was informed of any existing or potential work site hazards that could affect workers or other persons at the work site, by failing to communicate to workers tasked with working around and/or on a tank that it was drained but not otherwise cleaned and was therefore unsafe for any hot work.
  • Section 3(2) of the OHS Act, being an employer, failed to ensure that worker(s) engaged in the work of that employer were adequately trained in all matters necessary to perform their work in a healthy and safe manner.
  • Section 115(3) of the OHS Code, being an employer, failed to ensure that an emergency response plan was current.
  • Section 116 of the OHS Code being an employer, did fail to ensure that an emergency response plan included all elements required by section 116 of the OHS Code.

Voltegic Energy Services Ltd., being an employer, was charged with three counts:

  • Section 3(2) of the OHS Act, failure to ensure worker(s) engaged in the work of that employer were adequately trained in all matters necessary to perform their work in a healthy and safe manner.
  • Section 115(1) of the OHS Code, failure to establish an emergency response plan for responding to an emergency that could require rescue or evacuation.
  • Section 180(1) of the OHS Code, failure to ensure before workers were sent to a work site, arrangements were in place to transport injured or ill workers from the work site to the nearest health care facility.