TSB investigation into pickup truck versus train collision finds rail crossings should not depend solely on motorists doing the right thing
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSB) is calling on railways, road authorities and regulators to reassess how much they rely on drivers stopping at passive rail crossings after a fatal collision at Hunt Road, in the Township of Cramahe, Ontario last summer.
Safety lessons from a familiar crossing
In its report, the TSB stresses a defence “built on the requirement to stop at a passive crossing equipped with a stop sign” needs to be supplemented to improve safety. The investigation draws on behavioural research showing that drivers often roll or ignore stop signs when they believe the chance of encountering conflicting traffic is very low. That tendency is amplified at rural rail crossings where trains are infrequent, and motorists are highly familiar with the route.
The TSB notes that the driver in this case regularly used the Hunt Road crossings and would have known that only two or three trains typically passed during daylight hours. Over time, experience like that can create a mental model in which a train’s arrival at exactly the wrong moment seems extremely unlikely, and a collision even more so.
The 2025 Hunt Road collision
The crash occurred on 14 July 2025 at about 8:09 a.m., when a westbound Canadian Pacific Kansas City (CPKC) intermodal freight train struck a southbound pickup truck at Mile 115.64 of the Belleville Subdivision. The train was travelling at 56 mph; the pickup’s driver, the sole occupant, was killed.
Hunt Road crosses two separate rail lines within 200 metres. To the north, the Canadian National (CN) Kingston Subdivision is protected by flashing lights, a bell and gates that activate before a train is visible. Further south, the CPKC crossing where the collision occurred is a passive public crossing marked only with a standard retroreflective crossing sign and a stop sign.
Data from the pickup’s event data recorder show the vehicle approached the CPKC tracks at roughly 26 km/h, well below the 80 km/h speed limit. When the train came into view, about 2.2 seconds before impact, the driver tried to accelerate clear of the crossing. A TSB photogrammetric analysis concluded that at that point the vehicle was moving too fast to be able to stop before the tracks, and that the data “are not consistent with a vehicle preparing to stop short of the crossing.”
Investigators found no defects in the vehicle’s right‑side brakes or wheel assemblies. The locomotive horn was sounded in accordance with the Canadian Rail Operating Rules and continued when it became apparent the pickup was not stopping. But with the truck’s windows closed and engine running, earlier TSB work suggests the horn may not have been audible to the driver until the train was less than two seconds away.
Sightlines, history and calls for stronger defences
Sightlines and signage emerged as additional risk factors. A Transport Canada inspection the day after the crash identified non‑compliance with Grade Crossings Regulations, warning that sightlines “may not be adequate for the grades as well as current road use,” and that vegetation was partially blocking advance warning signs. CPKC carried out brush‑cutting near the tracks, while Transport Canada pressed the Township of Cramahe to deal with signage, surface conditions and vegetation. The township later reported clearing brush and finishing pavement markings at the crossing.
The Hunt Road site also has a recent history of train–vehicle conflict. In October 2022, another pickup truck, whose driver was familiar with the area, slid onto the same crossing on a dark, drizzly evening and was hit by a CPKC freight.
For the TSB, the broader lesson is that human behaviour at passive crossings—especially those controlled only by a stop sign—is too inconsistent to serve as the primary safeguard. The Board says railways, regulators and municipalities must look at ways to bolster defences at such crossings, from improved sightlines to active warning devices, so that safety does not depend on drivers correctly judging a risk they rarely see materialize.
